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1 Joseph Stalin: power and ideas
Sarah Davies and James Harris
Sralin, like the other 'evil dicrarors' of the twentieth century, remains the
subjecr of enduring public fascination. I Academic anenrion, however,
has shifted away from the srudy of'Grear Men', including Sralin, rowards
the lillie men and women, such as the now celebrared Srepan Podlubnyi,
and rowards Sralinisr political culrure more generally. 2 Ironically this is ar
a time when we have unprecedented access ro hitheno classified marerial
on Sralin, the individual. 3 The objecr of this volume is ro reinvigorare
scholarly inreresr in Sralin, his ideas, and the narure of his power.
Although Sralin cenainly did nor single-handedly derermine everything
abour the ser of policies, practices, and ideas we have come ro call
Sralinism, ir is now indisputable thar in many respecrs his influence was
decisive. A clearer undersranding of his significance will allow more
precise analysis of the origins and narure of Sralinism irself.
I Note the interest in several recent publications aimed primarily at a popular readership:
Marrin .-\mis, Koba rite Dread: lAughter aud the Twenty lVlilJion (London: Jonathan Cape,
2002); Simon Sebag Montdiore, SIalin: 171l! Caun of Ihe Red Tsar (London: Wcidenfeld
and Nicolson, 2003); Donald Rayfield, SUllirl arid his Harig"'''' (London: Viking, 2004).
2 Podlubnyi bas been made famous by Jochcn Hel1beck in a number of publications,
including 'Fasbioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of St<pan Podlubnli, 1931-1939',
Jahrbucher fur Geschichu Osteuropas 44 (1996),344-73. On the 'cultural turn' in Soviet
hist'Ol)', see rhe inrroduetion by Sheila Fitzpatrick in Sr.alinism: et:.I Direcn"ons (London:
Routledge, 2000).
J !\1.uch afthis is in the 'Stalin/and' in the Russian State Archive ofSocio-Polirical History
(Rossiiskii gosudarsrvc.nnyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi ismrii l henceforth RGASPI
fond 558, opis' II») which includes correspondence received from and sent to everyone
from the members of his inner circle to peasants and foreign joumalists; documents
relating to Stalin's activities in the organisations in which he worked; speeches) anicles)
biographical materials, and so on. Some documents from this collection have been
published) including the twO important volumes: Lars lih, Dleg V. Naumov, and Dleg
V. Khlevniuk (cds.») Stalin's Leuers to MowUJ'V, /92~J936 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1995); R. W. Davies) O. Khlevniuk) E.A. Rees L Koshelcva, and L Rogovaia
(cds.») The Sc.a/in-KagallofJic.h Correspondence, /93J-J936 (New Ha\lcn: YaJc University
Press, 2003).
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'usually under a single leader'. II There was ofcourse an assumption that the
leader was critical to the workings of totalitarianism: at the apex of a
monolithic, cenrralised, and hierarchical system, it was he who issued the
orders which were fulfilled unquestioningly by his subordinates. However,
adherents of the model were not generally concerned with the leader except
in his capacity as a function of the system and its ideology. There was
certainly little empirical analysis of the significance of individual leaders:
the personalities or ideas of a Lenin or a Stalin were not considered critical
to an understanding of the inner workings of totalitarianism. 12
It was partly dissatisfaction with this approach which lay behind Roben
Tucker's attempt to reassess the significance of the leader. The first volume
of his Stalin biography argued that the personality of the dictator was
central to understanding the development of Stalinism. Tucker distin-
guished between the impact of Lenin and that of Stalin, suggesting that
the Stalinist outcome was far from inevitable and was dependent in large
measure on Stalin's own drive for power. Delving into the unchaned
waters of psychohistory, he sought the roots of Stalinism in Stalin's experi-
ences in childhood and beyond. 13 This was an imponant new deparrure,
which coincided with other effons to find alternatives to Stalinism, notably
Stephen Cohen's study of Bukharin. 14 Yet the psychohistory on which it
depended was always rather speculative. 15 The second volume of the
biography was in many ways more rounded. Stalin ill Power argued that
Russia's authoritarian political culture and state-building traditions, as well
as Stalin's personality, played a key role in shaping Stalinism. 16
Tucker's work stressed the absolute nature of Stalin's power, an
assumption which was increasingly challenged by later revisionist histori-
ans. In his Origins of rhe Grear Purges, Arch Gerry argued that the Soviet
political system was chaotic, that institutions often escaped the control of
the centre, and that Stalin's leadership consisted to a considerable extent
in responding, on an ad hoc basis, to political crises as they arose. 17
II C. J. Friedrich, Tor.alitan·o"ism (Cambridgc, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954),
pp.52-3.
12 Robert Tucker, TI,e Soviet Pob"tical Mi"d (London: Gcorge Allen and Unwin, ]972), p. 28.
13 Tucker, S,aH" as Revolutionary.
14 S. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A PoHtical Riography. 1888-1938 (New
York: A. A. Knopf, 1973).
1S Although Tucker's approach was always much more historically grounded than the far
less convincing psychoanalyricalaccQunl offered by D. Rancour-Lafferiere in 77Je Mind of
Scali" (Aon Arbor: Ardis, 1988).
16 Tucker, StaH" in Power.
17 J. Arch Getty, Ongi1/S of the Grear Purges: The Soviet Communist Parry Reconsidered.
1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni"er1iiry Press, 1985), pp. 4-9.
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Gerry's work was influenced by political science of the 1960s onwards,
which, in a critique of the totalitarian model, began to consider the
possibility that relatively autonomous bureaucratic institutions might
have had some influence on policy-making at the highest level. 18 In the
1970s, historians took up the implicit challenge and explored a variety of
influences and pressures on decision-making. J9 The 'discovery' of strong
institutional interests and lively bureaucratic politics begged the question
of whether Stalin did dominate the political system, or whether he was
'embattled', as one key study put i1. 2o
During the 'new Cold War' of the 1980s, the work of the revisionists
became the object of heated controversy, accused of minimising Stalin's
role, of downplaying the terror, and so on21 With the the collapse of the
Soviet Union, some of the heat has gone out of the debate. After the initial
wave of self-justificatory 'findings', the opening up of the archives has
stimulated serious work with sources. The politicisation of the field has
become noticeably less pronounced, particularly amongst a younger
generation of scholars in both Russia and the West for whom the legiti-
macy of socialism and the USSR are no longer such critical issues.
Political history in general has attracted fewer students in favour of the
more intellectually fashionable cultural history. However, there are signs
of the emergence of a renewed interest in political history, of which this
I · I ??vo ume IS one examp e.--
Ail the contributors to the volume represent the post-1991 wave of
scholarship grounded in empirical work in the former Soviet archives.
From North America and Europe, including Russia, they range from
scholars who have been working on these problems for over half a century
to those who have recently completed doctoral dissertations. Each
It! For example, Gordon Skilling, 'lmerest Groups in Communist Politics" lvorld Policies 3
(1966), 435-51.
Ie) See for example, M,oshc Lewin. 'Taking Grain: Soviet Policies of Agricultur:ll
Procurements Before the \'{'ar', in C. Abr.Jmsky (cd.), Essays ;11 H01lour of £. H. CalT
(London: f\1acmillan, 1974); Jonathan Harris, 'The Origins of the Conflict Between
l'v\alenkov and Zhdanov, 1939-1941', Sla'i.';c Rev;cu' 2 (1976), 287-303; Daniel Brower,
ICoJlecti\ued Agriculture in Smolensk: the Pany,lhc Peasantry and the Crisis of 1932',
Russia" Re'"oJiew 2 (J 977), 151-66; Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Cultural Revolution i" Russia,
/928-193/ (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1978); Peter Solomon, 'Soviet
Penal Policy, 1917-1934; A Reinterpretation') Slavic Revietv 2 (1980), 195-217; \Verner
Hahn, Posl'l.uar Sav;Cl Politics: The Fall ofZhdanav and the Defeat ofA1oderat;on, J946-1 953
(lthaca: Cornell University Press, 1982),
:!o \'Villiam O. l\lt.cCagg, Jr, Stali" Emballlcd, 1943-1948 (Detroit: \Vaync Stme University
Press, 1978). See also Gabor Rinerspom, 'L'ct3t en lune contre lui-mcmc: Tcnsions
sociales el conJlits politiqucs en URSS, 1936-1938', Lib" 4 (1978).
21 Sec, for example, the debates in Runion Review 4 (1986).
22 For discussions on 'The Nc\" Political Hisrory' sec Kn'rika (I), 2004.
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considers a specific facet of Stalin as politician and thinker. In the discus-
sion which follows, we focus on what light these analyses shed on two
important questions. The first, the nature ofStalin's power, has long been
a central issue in the historiography. The second, Stalin's Marxism, and
the relationship between ideas and mobilisation, has received much less
attention.
The majority of what we know about Stalin concerns his years in
power. While this focus of the historian's attention is entirely logical, it
is easy to forget that by the time he defeated Bukharin and became the
uncontested leader of the Bolshevik Party, Stalin was fifty years old. He
had lived two-thirds of his life. It would be surprising indeed if by this
time Stalin was not fully developed as a personality, a thinker, and a
politician. And yet somehow, few works on Stalin pay much attention
to his 'formative years,.23 Alfred Rieber's chapter on Stalin's Georgian
background shows why this has been the case. He explains why sources
on Stalin's early years were pamcularly subject to manipulation and
censorship. He makes use of published and unpublished memoirs to cut
through the myrh-makjng and cast new hght on Stahn's early life and the
formation of his identity. He shows how Stalin adapted his pohtical
persona, shaped by his 'frontier perspective' to benefit his career as a
revolutionary and politician. His early experiences left him with a pre-
ference for decision-making in small informal groups in place of large
committees, a conspiratorial mentahty, and an acceptance of violence.
In his study of Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities, Jeremy Smith
picks up this story of Stalin's formative years in the period just after the
Revolution. He shows Stalin already confident and consistent in his
ideas on nationalities pohcy, willing and able to stand up to Lenin on
questions of policy towards the national minorities and the relationship
between Russia and the other Soviet republics. The chapter by David
Priestland echoes this impression that Stalin was confident in his ideas
and quite willing and able to engage other leading Bolsheviks on key
issues. This is consonant with growing evidence that pohcy debates
played a much stronger role in the Lenin succession than we had
imagined. 24 Machine politics did, nevertheless, playa crucial role in
Stalin's ability to defeat his opponents. In his chapter, Smith also dis-
cusses Stahn's early experiences of high pohtics within the Bolshevik
Party in power, particularly as they developed his skjlls of factional
23 One recent Russian study begins 'Let us nO[ detain ourselves with Stalin's early years, for
they do not contribute anything to an understanding ofhis later attitudes and worldview,'
Iu. Zhukov, blO; Stal;" (Moscow: Vagrius, 2003), p. 8.
24 Sec, for example, Li.h et a1. (cds.), Slaliu's !.ellers to MoIOlOV, pp. 25-6.
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struggle and institutional empire-building. In observing the failure of
the Commissariat of Nationalities to provide an adequate power base,
he anticipates Harris' contriburion on Stalin's next pOSt, as General
Secretary of the Parry.
The idea that Stalin used his position as General Secretary to build a
network of loyal political clients has long held a central place in our
understanding of his rise to political supremacy. It has also shaped our
sense ofwhy the system evolved into a personal dictatorship, and how the
system worked, suggesting that ideas did not matter as much as ruthless
political manipulation behind closed doors. James Harris' study of
Central Committee archives shows that the Secretariat played an impor-
tant role in Stalin's rise, but nOt as we have commonly understood it.
Harris argues that the Secretariat was barely able to cope with its tasks in
the assignment and distribution of cadres. There is little evidence to
suggest that Stalin was able to use it to build a personal following. The
Secretariat was nevenheless invaluable to Stalin - as a source of informa-
tion on the needs and wants of Parry officialdom. In particular, he
encouraged the common distaste for intra-Party democracy in order to
harass and frustrate his rivals, to limit the dissemination of their ideas. In
this way, the Secretariat played a critical role in Stalin's rise to power,
though not as the source of the personalistic dictatorship which emerged
in the 1930s. A substantial pan of Parry officialdom voted for him
because they felt he served their interests. Harris observes that they
were less sure that he did when he imposed the impossible targets of the
First Five-Year Plan and the command-administrative system emerged.
However, having ,bemselves undermined intra-Party democracy and any
prospect of questioning the 'Central Committee Line', there was little
they could do.
While newly released archival materials on the 1920s have yet to attract
much scholarly attention, there is already a considerable body of work on
Soviet politics in the J930s. We can now trace the steps by which Stalin
achieved a steady concentration and personalisation of power. From the
protocols of top Party organs and other materials, we can see in detail the
steady decline in the consultative aspects of policy-making which char-
acterised the 1920s. We knew that Parry congresses and conferences were
increasingly rare, as were meetings of the Central Committee. The meet-
ings themselves ceased to involve any discussion of policy, but appear to
have been orchestrated to publicise major policy shifts. We have learned
that the Politburo stopped meeting formally by the middle of the 1930s as
power shifted to an informal coterie around Stalin. The letters and other
notes they exchanged has shown us that even with this group, relations
were changing in the 1930s. The friendly informaliry that characterised
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their exchanges with Stalin in the early 1930s was replaced with a dis-
tinctly sycophantic tone a decade later. While there is evidence of debate
and disagreements with Stalin in the early thirties, within a few years
his word had become law. More sinister evidence of the entrenchment
of personal dictatorship is his increasing reliance on the People's
Commissariat oflntemal Affairs (NKVD) as an instrument of rule 25
This picture of the concentration of personal power can be misleading,
however, if taken in isolation. The contributions to this volume examine
the nature of Stalin's power, bur without losing sight of the context in
which it was exercised. Even Khlevniuk, who most emphatically asserts the
vasrness of Stalin's dictatorial powers, observes that neither in the early
1930s nor later in the decade could Stalin act alone. His inner circle and
others close to the centre of power retained some influence and autonomy
(though Geny and Khlevniuk, for example, disagree on just how much
influence and autonomy they had). Nor could Stalin decide every maner of
policy. His inte.rvenrions were decisive, bur there were substantial areas of
policy that he left 10 others. Though Stalin's power was great, he could nOl
always translate his ideas into action. Political and social structures were
nOl soft puny for him to mould to his wilJ. Stalin may have been an
extremely powerful dictator, but he may nOl have felt as though he was,
for his personal dictatorship took shape against a backdrop of revolutionary
change, economic crisis, bureaucratic chaos, and a fear of enemies.
In his contribution on Stalin as 'Prime Minister', Arch Geny criticises
those who regard the 'decline' of formal decision-making structures as
synonymous ,,~th the accretion of tOlal power by Stalin. Rather, Geny
sees the emergence ofa decision-making process similar in key respects to a
cabinet, which Stalin, as the 'Prime Minister', dominated. The reduction
in regular, formal meetings constituted what he calls the 'normalisation of
the Politburo' as it adjusted 10 the great increase in decision-making in a
centrally planned economy in the midst of a crash program of rapid
industrialisation and collectivisation. Meetings were streamlined and
made more frequent. Most issues were decided without discussion by
means of a vote (oprosolll). Members of the Politburo were responsible
for key commissariats and areas of policy, thus retaining substantial power
bases and influence over decisions. Considerable irtfluence over decision-
making would also have been retained by those individuals and institutions
that provided information on the basis of which decisions were made26
25 Sec Oleg Khlcvniuk's contribution to this volume.
26 Such as lhe Council of Peoples' Commissars, the CounciJ of Labour and Defence,
Commissariats and their commissars (including members of the Politburo) the
Planning Commission, experts and advisors, temporary and pennanent commissions
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Rieber, Khlevniuk, and R. W. Davies share Gerry's view that in areas
where Stalin took an interest, he dominated policy-making absolutely.
His views were rarely questioned. Particularly in the later 1930s, many of
those around Stalin came to fear autonomous action, and merely tried to
anticipate the leader's preferences. Where Stalin dominated policy, he
could exhibit both flexibility and dogmatism. Rieber's second contribu-
tion to this volume provides a nuanced analysis of the apparent paradoxes
ofStalin's security policy, showing where Stalin learned from his mistakes
and where his ideas remained unchanged. In reference to intractable
issues of economic policy, such as the function of money in a socialist
economy, R. W. Davies observes Stalin's flexibility and ability to learn
from experience, but he also points out occasions on which Stalin abjectly
failed to anticipate the disastrous consequences of major decisions, such
as the impact ofswingeing grain collections in 1931 and 1932. Khlevniuk,
in his contribution, refers to Stalin's propensity to shift his position in the
face of such disasters as 'crisis pragmatism'.
Where Stalin did not actively intervene in policy, others filled the void.
\'<Iorking with Stalin's correspondence from his months on vacation in the
mid-1930s, Gerry observes the large number of decisions (89 per cent)
taken by the Politburo ,vithout Stalin's participation. R. W. Davies' work
on agricultural policy contrasts Stalin's detailed management of grain
procurement campaigns with his relative lack of interest in livestock
issues. Sarah Davies' contribution shows not only Stalin's extraordinary
personal influence over film production, but also his desire to have a
reliable lieutenant to realise his will, as well as the great difficulty of
making individuals and institutions respond effectively to his will.
Clearly, there existed coherent structures that allowed the system to
function in his absence. Those structures served to implement the dicta-
tor's orders, but they could also act as a constraint on Stalin's freedom of
acoon.
The idea that Stalin and the Soviet leadership had to contend with
relatively autonomous institutions and groups is nO! new. In the 1950s,
historians observed that technical specialists and managers did nO! always
behave in ways the regime wanted. 27 In the 1970s and 80s, social histori-
ans observed that society was not a blank slate either, but only since the
opening of the archives have we had the opportunity to study in depth the
established by the Politburo, and so on). G. M. Adibckov, K.l\'\. Anderson, and
L. A. Rogovaia (cds.), Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b). Povestki dnia Zaseda"il~
19/9-/952: KOla/aCI 3 vols. (Moscow: Rosspcn, 2000), I, pp. 18-19.
:!7 David Granick, Alfanagemcm of the l"dusrrilJJ Finn in the USSR (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1954); Joseph Berliner, Factory aud A-tanager;ll the USSR (Cambridge,
M.Rss.: Harvard University Press, 1957).
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workings of institutions and officials higher up the administrative hier-
archy. In this volume, Khlevniuk obseIVes the strength of bureaucratic
self-interest, or, as Stalin would have known it, 'departmentalism'
(vedomSlVeI11l0Sc'). CommJssariars) planners) control organs) regional
Party organisations, and other institutions were constantly angling to
promote policies favourable to them and to limit their obligations, fight-
ing amongst each other where their interests conflicted. 28 This can be
viewed as an important source of Stalin's power, given that he was
viewed, and acted, as supreme arbiter, but Stalin's persistent frustration
with 'departmentalism' suggests that he considered it anything bur a
source of strength.
In spite of his uncontested position and immense political power, it
seems that Stalin never felt entirely secure. The failure to contain institu-
tional self-interest has something to do with this, as did the constant fear
of war and of the infiltration of foreign enemies. Rieber's chapter on
Stalin as a foreign policy-maker makes a compelling argument that
beneath the surface ofzigzags and contradictions in Soviet security policy
lay Stalin's enduring fear about the vulnerability of the Soviet borderlands
in the context of what he was convinced would be an inevitable war with
the capitalist world. Nor can the Great Terror (1936-8) be understood
except as a response to Stalin's insecurity. In his chapter on the changing
image of the enemy in the three Moscow show trials, Chase shows Stalin
at his most powerful and powerless, shaping and directing popular opi-
nion in a massive and devastating campaign to unmask hidden enemies,
while lashing out at chimerical enemies who were largely the product of
his own conspiratorial mentality.
How much did Stalin's dictatorship change after the Terror? We still
know almost nothing about the period from the curtailing of the 'mass
operations' in late 1938 to the lazi invasion in June 1941,29 and only
omewhat more abour the structure of the dictatorship in the Second
World War. The post-war period, often labelled 'High Stalinism' has
generated more work and debate. As the label indicates, many historians
argue that the period from 1945-53 marked the apogee of Stalin's personal
dictatorship, his power reinforced by terror and victory in war, imposed at
the e""pense of institutional coherence. 30 Others have questioned the image
of the disintegration of political structures in the post-war period,
2M Sec also Paul Gregory (cd.), Behind rhe Fafade of Stalin's Cmmllo"d Ecol/omy: Ev£de"cc
from the Soviet Stou and Parry Archives (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I).,. One of the very few works on this period is Harris, 'The Origin of the Conflict'.
30 See for example, Milovan Diilas, CmnJcrraIioIU with Stalin (London: Han-Davis,
1962), p.73; Nikita Khrushchev, KhrushclJI!1J Remembers (London: Deutsch, 1971),
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observing conflicts among powerful institutional interests and factions that
shaped policy in the period.3\
Recent archival research has tempered this debate somewhat. It has
become clear that Stalin was feeling his age after the war and began to
reduce his work schedule. The Council of Peoples' Commissars,
renamed the Council of Ministers in ) 946, was given almost exclusive
control over economic issues, and some political issues, such as nomenk-
lawra appointments, were passed to other organs within the Central
Committee apparatus. 32 While Stalin's involvement in day-to-day decision-
making declined, he continued to keep a close eye on things, intervening
occasionally and often violently]3 His interventions remained decisive,
but his withdrawal from day-to-day decision-making only strengthened
institutional coherence and intensified struggles for power and for his
favour. 34 Khlevniuk argues that Stalin's personal dictatorship had never
challenged institutional coherence. Though his power was limitless,
the complexity of decision-making had 'consistently and inevitably
reproduced elements of oligarchical rule'. Put simply, Stalin had always
needed an inner circle with close ties to strong bureaucratic institutions.
According to Khlevniuk, Stalin's power was at its height in his role as
arbiter of conflicting institutional interests. His semi-retirement in the
late ) 940s made that role more difficult, and he was more inclined
to resort to violence in his occasional interventions. In response, his
inner circle adopted mechanisms of collective decision-making on the
basis of which the system was able to work smoothly without him when
he died.
While the nature of Stalin's power has been a constant preoccupation
of scholars, until recently, few studies have paid serious attention to Stalin
as a Marxist. Only in 2002 did a systematic study of his political thought
appear. 35 He is typically viewed as the quintessential pragmatic politician,
interested primarily in power for its own sake, and only superficially
pp. 298-301. Also Roger Perhybridgc, A Hisrory oj Pos/war Russia (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1966); Roben Conquest, Pmver a"d Policy ill The USSR (London: Macmillan,
1961).
)1 1n Stalin Embauled, \X'illiam O. McCagg went so far as to argue that Stalin's power was
challenged by these groups. Sec also Timothy Dunmore, nil! StalitllJl Command
Economy: The Soviet State Apparorus alld Ecollom;c Policy, 1945-1953 (London:
l\1acmillan, 1980); Hahn, POSTwar Soviet Politics.
32 Yoram Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism: The CounciJ of lvtinisters and the Soviet Neo-
patrimonial State, 1946-1953', Jounlal of i\10dem History 4 (2002), 705-9, 715.
)) Yoram Gorlizki and Olcg Khlcvniuk, Cold Peace: Slali" alld lhe Soviel Ruling Circle,
1945-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
34 Iurii Zhukov, 'Bor'ba za vlast' v rukovodsrve SSSR \. 1945-1952 godakh', Voprosy isloni
1 (1995), 23-39; O. Khlevniuk, 'Sovctskaia ckonomicheskaia politika na rube7.hc
194D-195O-x godov i "Delo Gosplana" " Orechcsroemlaia iSIO";;a 3 (2001), 77-89.
35 Erik van Ree, The Polin'cal Thouglu ofJoseph Stalill (London: RoutledgcCurzon, 2002).
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committed to Marxist ideology. In public he invoked Marxist principles
cynically and represented himselfas a theorist to legitimate his power. His
dismissive attitude to these principles is evident in the many ways in
which he apparently distoned and abandoned them when political exi-
gency required. He is widely accused of having betrayed the original
Marxist ideals in favour of inegalitarianism, social conservatism, and,
especially, Russian nationalism, described by Carr as 'the only political
creed which moved him at all deeply'. 36
One of the advantages of the availability of new archival sources is the
light they shed on this question of Stalin's relationship to ideology. If one
accepts the argument above, one would have expected Stalin to invoke
Marxist language in public, but not in private. Yet what is striking is that
even in his most intimate correspondence with Molotov, Kaganovich,
and others, Stalin did in fact continue to employ Marxist concepts and
frameworks]? As Pollock points out in this volume, the USSR 'did not
keep TWO sets ofbooks, at least on ideological questions'. 38 It appears that
adherence to Marxism was more than just a source of political legitimacy
for Stalin. But what was the nature of his Marxism? Marxism itself is ~
diverse and in some respects inconsistent body of ideas. Which of these
did Stalin draw on' How did his ideas evolve? And what was the relation
ship beTWeen the ideology and his political practice? Several of the con
tributors to this volume address these questions directly.
Erik van Ree is the author of the most comprehensive study to date 0:
Stalin's political thought. 39 He has carried out extensive research it.
Stalin's unpublished papers, especially his library. What did Stalin read!
How did this influence his thinking? Van Ree's research shows that hi(
(non-fiction) library consisted of overwhelmingly Marxist works, whic!;
he continued to study and annotate until the end of his life40 Van Ree'(
conclusion is that these ideas mattered to Stalin, and that he remained 2
committed Marxist, if Marxism is defined in its broadest sense.
In his contribution to the present volume, van Ree grapples with th'
problem of the alleged Russification of Marxism under Stalin. He dis
agrees with a prevailing perception that Stalin fundamentally adapted anc
distoned Marxism to suit Russian conditions." Instead he concurs witl
such scholars as Leszek Kolakowski and Andrzej Walicki that Stalin did no
10 Carr. The Russian Revoluci<mfrom Leni"l0 Stalin, p. 170.
31 uh C( 31. (cds.). Stalin's Leuers to Molotov; R. W. Davies et al. (cds.). The Scali,,·
Kaganovich COTTespondence.
38 Sec also j. Arch Gerry, The Road to Terror: Scalin a"d the Self-Destruction of the BoLshevik:.
1932-1939 (New Haven: Yale Univcn;ity Press, 1999), p. 22.
39 Van Rce, Political Thought. 40 Ibid., pp. 16,258-61. 41 Tucker, Scali" i" Power.
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substantially modify basic Marxist tenets42 Van Ree goes much funher
than his predecessors in tracing the influences upon and evolution of
Stalin's thought. Ideas such as 'revolution from above', 'socialism in one
country', or the continuing need for a strong state and for the flourishing of
nations under socialism were far from Stalinist innovations. All had ante-
cedents in the thinking of Marx or his interpreters (including Engels,
Vollmar, Bauer, Kautsky, Lenin), or, in some cases, other Western revolu-
tionary traditions (such as Jacobinism) which themselves influenced the
followers ofMarx. Only the extreme chauvinism and anti-cosmopolitanism
of the post-war years are difficult to reconcile with Marxist thinking, yet
even these had anti-capitalist overrones consistent with a Marxist approach.
It was precisely because Marxism was so elastic, encompassing such a
variety of sometimes contradictory tendencies that Stalin was able to reject
the more democratic, liberal strands in favour of those which seemed most
compatible with Russian/Soviet development. Van Ree concludes that the
Western revolutionary tradition was itself 'more permeated with "Stalinist"
elements than we would like to think'. Stalin simply elevated many of these
elements to the status of dogma.
Several authors follow van Ree in taking Stalin's Marxism seriously.
Alfred Rieber, however, reminds us that the young Stalin's journey to
Marxism was not as straightforward as its description in the official cult
biographies discussed in David Brandenberger's chapter. Rieber casts
doubt on Stalin's claim to have become involved in underground
Marxist groups at the age of fifteen. In the rich frontier situation of
Georgia, the adolescent Stalin absorbed a variety of other intellectual
influences: populism, nationalism, as well as a specifically Georgian
nationalist-inclined strain of Marxism. He was also drawn to romantic
literature with its vivid depictions of heroes defending the poor. All these
influences may have contributed not only to the obvious nationalist
currents in his thinking, but also to the less obvious romantic, populist
interpretation of Marxism to which he was attracted.
It is this 'Bolshevik romanticism' which David Priestland emphasises.
His chapter draws our attention to tensions within Marxism-Leninism and
how these played out in Stalin's own thinking in the period 1917-39. He
distinguishes berween Marxism's 'scientistic and deterministic side' and its
'more voluntaristic and romantic side'. While the former accentuates the
role of economic forces, technique (wkhllika) and so on, the latter focuses
42 Lcszck Kolakowski, 'Marxist Roots of Stalinism', in R. Tucker (ed.), Stalinism: Essays ill
Historical 11lt.erpretat;orl (New York: \Vl. Wi. Nonon, 1977), pp. 283-98; AndrLcj Walicki,
Marxism and the Leap 10 the Kingdom of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford Univenity Press)
1995), ch. 5.
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on the active role of the proletariat, of politics and consciousness.
Although, like many other Bolsheviks, he oscillated between these two
approaches, Stalin seems to have been most consistently attracted to the
'quasi-romantic' view with its emphasis on heroism and will.
This voluntarism left a strong mark on Stalin's attitude to mass mobi-
lisation, which is examined in several of the contributions. Priestland
highlights how the leader's populist, anti-bourgeois outlook made him
a strong advocate of unleashing worker activism, particularly during
the Cultural Revolution. In the later 1930s, he continued to stress the
importance of ideological mobilisation of what were now more often
termed 'the people', for example, during the Stakhanovite campaign.
Stalin's conviction, highlighted by Priestland, that 'the production of
souls is more important than the production of tanks' explains his con-
stant attention to cultural matters, which Sarah Davies examines in her
chapter on Stalin's role as patron of cinema in the mid-1930s. She shows
how Stalin devoted an extraordinary amount of time to what he described
as 'helping' to tum Soviet cinema into a truly mass art, capable of
mobilising the people for the goals of socialism. Not only did he offer
financial support and promote the prestige of cinema, but he also parti-
cipated actively in the making of films, trying to ensure that they convey
suitable ideological messages packaged in an entertaining way.
Mass mobilisation was one important dimension of the Great Terror.
Debates about the Terror have tended to focus on matters of power and
security (see above). While these must of course be paramount in any
explanation, they should not overshadow the ideological issues. Van Ree
has suggested that Stalin's Marxist convictions led him to believe in
the continued existence of a class struggle, and that this belief shaped the
form that the terror assumed43 The question ofbelief is a complex one, but
what is abundantly clear is that Stalin recognised the potential of the terror
to mobilise the population against real or imagined 'enemies of the people'
and for Stalin and the Soviet state44
Sarah Davies notes that Stalin was particularly concerned to shape the
image of the internal and external enemy in films. Like films, the show
trials served as powerful didactic tools. Bill Chase's chapter reveals the
extent to which Stalin participated in the staging of the trials, both in
Moscow and in the provinces. These performances provided an oppor-
tunity for the carefully orchestrated construction of threats to the public.
Stalin was personally involved in the crafting of these threats, which
changed markedly over the period 1936-8, as did the intended
4) Van Ree, Political Thought, pp. 124-5.
44 On me question of belief, sec Getcy's useful discussion in Road co Terror pp. 15-24.
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audience. In 1936, the threat was defined as opposlUonists turned
enemy agents and terrorists, whose only aim was to seize power. The
audience for this trial was primarily Parry members. By 1937, the
message had become more populist: the threat was now from Parry
officials who were engaging in terrorism, espionage, and wrecking in
order to overturn the Soviet system and restore capitalism. This was
designed to mobilise the 'little people', ordinary Soviet citizens, to
unmask the 'enemies of the people' - scapegoats for economic failures.
In 1938, the threat, and the audience, had turned truly global - a
conspiracy of rightists and Trotsk)'ists were allegedly intent on dismem-
bering the USSR with the assistance of fascist and capitalist powers.
In Stalin's mind, the uncovering of such a vast conspiracy highlighted
the need for a greater focus on the Marxist-Leninist education (vospiranie)
of cadres. Priestland argues that Stalin attributed the ideological contam-
ination of cadres to an excessive focus on tekhnika at the expense of
politika. Henceforth ideas were to assume a much higher prioriry. The
Shore Course in Parry history of 1938 was designed to be a primer in
the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism to inspire and instruct the
intelligentsia, and to prevent them from going over to the enemy.
Stalin was sensitive to the limited appeal of the Short Course for the
'masses', however, appreciating that different approaches were required
for different audiences. In his chapter, David Brandenberger argues that
the Stalin cult - one of the most striking features of Stalinism - was part
of a mobilisational strategy directed primarily towards 'the masses'. The
cult appears to be a gross aberration from socialist ideals (although van
Ree has argued that even this had antecedents within Marxist thought),
and many historians have interpreted it as a symptom of Stalin's psy-
chological need for self-aggrandisement45 \Vbile not denying that this
may have played a role, Brandenberger maintains that Stalin himself
was well aware of the problematic status of the cult ofpersonaliry within
Marxism. He justified the phenomenon as an effective way of appealing
to ordinary workers and peasants for whom a heroic, biographical
narrative was more inspiring than undiluted Marxism-Leninism. So
while he deliberately removed from the draft of the Shorr Course sections
which focused too closely on his own biography, he allowed the produc-
tion of a separate Stalin biography for the 'simple people'. This fmally
appeared relatively late, at the end of 1939, partly because of the
ideological and political turmoil of the 1930s. In Stalin's mind, the
focus on personaliry was not incompatible with Marxist-Leninist
<I') Van Rcc, Polirical Thought, ch. t 2; Tucker. Stalin as Revolutionary and Staliu i1/ Power.
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teachings: 'the roiling masses and simple people cannot begin the srudy
of Marxism-Leninism with Lenin's and Stalin's writings. They should
start with the biography', he remarked in 1946.
Far from abandoning Marxism, Stalin remained committed ro the
ideology and ro its dissemination amongst Soviet citizens. This was
equally true of the post-war years which are often associated with
Stalin's rum ro extreme Russian nationalism. As van Ree has pointed
out, the stress on nation in this period never replaced the emphasis on
class. In his last years, Stalin spenr much of his time intervening in
academic disputes, from philosophy ro genetics and linguistics. Ethan
Pollock questions traditional assumptions that these interventions were
simply 'the ultimate ravings ofa dying megalomaniac', parr of a campaign
ro intimidate the intelligenrsia, an attempt ro encourage conflict amongst
his colleagues or ro heat up the Cold War. Instead they represenred
Stalin's concern with the health of ideology and Soviet science.
Stalin recognised the existence of an ideological crisis in the post-war
era. He sought ro taclde this by reinvigorating a body of theory which he
apparently recognised had become dogmatic. If SO\~et science were ro
flourish, as it must with the developmenr of the Cold War, then Marxist
theory must be used creatively. Only then would scientific truths be
uncovered. His forays inro linguistics were apparently intended ro currail
the Marrist monopoly over the discipline, and ro encourage discussion of
other approaches, with Stalin claiming that Marxism had ro develop and
change over time if it was ro remain relevant. Likewise his meetings with
political economists aimed to stimulate a genuinely fresh approach ro the
long-awaited textbook, rather than one which simply regurgitated
Marxist-Leninist cliches. The problem, of course, was that Stalin's inter-
ventions tended ro generate confusion rather than real debate, as every-
one waited for an authoritative answer from on high. The crisis was thus
deepened rather than resolved.
How is our image of Stalin changing following the opening up of the
archives' We have only just begun to digest the extensive new materials
already released, and more are likely to follow. Much work remains to be
done on both the narure of Stalin's power, and the significance of his
ideas. The related question of his political practices, touched on in some
of the contributions to this volume, also requires more systematic
srudy46 What is already clear is that the new materials do not paint a
black-and-white picture of either an unbridled tyrant in the unprincipled
46 Sheila Fitzpatrick offered some initial lhoughts on the question of how to approach
political practices in her paper 'Stalin, Molotov, and the: Practice of Politics', presented
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pursuit ofpower or an embattled leader reacting to uncontrollable forces.
Stalin emerges as a far more contradictory and complex figure. As a
leader, he ruthlessly destroyed his political rivals and built an unrivalled
personal dictatorship, yet he was never secure in his power. He was
obsessed with the division of the formal structures of power, but increas-
ingly worked only in small informal groups. He wanted to delegate
responsibilities, but never entirely trusted those who worked for him.
He strove to be at the hean of every major political decision, and in the
process directed some policy maners in great detail, while unerly ignoring
others. He was a perceptive thinker, but also capable offailing to see what
was right in front of him. He was genuinely driven by ideology, but
flexible in his tactics. He was in some respects a conventional Marxist,
but aggressively promoted the nation and the leader cult. He sought to
disseminate Marxist ideas as a means of encouraging activism, but his
methods often succeeded only in stifling initiative. Stalin's personal
influence on the development of the Soviet Union was extraordinary,
yet he did not operate in a vacuum and his ambitions were often thwaned.
The studies that follow explore these complexities and contradictions.
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